A more negative view of Musharraf

In an interview at FrontPage Magazine terror expert Steve Schippert says that

It is difficult to observe Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf’s imposition of a state of emergency and the suspension of the Pakistani constitution as anything other than a move of self-preservation. He did not impose a state of emergency at the tip of a military thrust into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the NorthWest Frontier Province in a concerted drive to crush the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Instead, he surrounded the Supreme Court and removed—once again—Supreme Court Chief Justice Chaudhry.

Schippert also thinks that the massive civilian opposition to Musharraf’s move will create a crisis. If tens of thousands of middle class people protest in the streets, will the army have the will to put them down?

Long story short, had Musharraf made even a modest attempt at packaging the State of Emergency as necessary for confronting the threat of extremist Taliban and al-Qaeda elements inside Pakistan’s own borders, he could have at least a moral leg to stand on. But he hasn’t even made an attempt to veil the declaration as such. This means he alienates the Pakistani public and Washington, which would be willing to stomach much in exchange for a Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance put on the defensive and into survival mode….

FP: To what degree has Musharraf been a valued ally in the fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban?

Schippert: Simply put, Musharraf’s value has always been that he kept Pakistan as a state from aligning against us. Our hope had been that he would aggressively take on the Taliban and al-Qaeda inside Pakistan. But he has not, and now they may well be too strong for him and his army to dispatch. Such are the magnified later dangers granted when terrorists are given safe haven through ‘peace accords,’ namely in ceding North and South Waziristan. And now it’s “later.”

However, Schippert also says:

And when Musharraf says he is declaring emergency powers and halting the court that would essentially unseat him with one decision in order to save Pakistan from a disintegration of sorts, it’s not like he is without a valid point.

FP: What should US policy be toward the developments and toward Musharraf and Pakistan in general?

Schippert: Toward the developments, the United States must stand on the principles of democracy and insist that Musharraf end the state of emergency and retire from uniformed service and as Army and Chief of Staff. President Bush made such a statement Monday and he is correct in doing so. The ripple effect for us extends beyond Pakistan if we do not. We will be perceived as without principle and an untrustworthy ally if we do not stand actively for democracy, especially among our allies. We can ill-afford this.

Interesting. What Schippert means by being a trustworthy ally is that we stand for democracy. But isn’t it the case the the U.S. keeps undermining its allies by lecturing them to become more democratic? And does he think we’ve been a trustworthy ally to Israel when we push the insane chimera of Palestinian democracy on them, notwithstanding the Palestinians’ continuing and open intent to destroy Israel? Schippert sounds like a neocon Bushite.

Schippert also advocates a major U.S. military intrusion into Pakistan:

There are more policy options than many may think with regard to Pakistan, some of which I discussed here last week. But no matter the specific combination enacted, U.S. policy must increasingly be one of action, and the American public has to come to terms with the cold hard fact that the defeat of al-Qaeda inside Pakistan will require American force. Unless there is a miraculous turn of tribal sentiment inside the tribal areas combined with a similarly miraculous newfound ambition from Pakistani leadership, Pakistan will not be that force. Our NATO allies can hardly stomach small and low intensity deployments to Afghanistan.

Yes, we are already stretched militarily. Yes, the political situation inside Pakistan is tumultuous. Yes, it will be immensely difficult and bloody. But there really isn’t much of a real alternative at the end of the day. Unlike in Iraq, inside Pakistan al-Qaeda is neither in survival mode nor on the defensive. And al-Qaeda gets stronger each day.

A full scale American military campaign to destroy Taliban and al Qaeda in Pakistan. Given the geographic, cultural, and political realities of the country, it’s hard to envisage.

- end of initial entry - < Sam B. writes:

Skip back to Iran and the Shah, and Musharaf now—does Schippert see the implications?

Posted by Lawrence Auster at November 06, 2007 02:19 PM | Send